Abstract: This paper deals with the theoretical concepts of image and imagery as used by the foremost imaginal psychologists. Attributing primary epistemological status to image and imagery, imaginal psychology school developed a new theory of image and imagery, questioning the older thesis on the derivative and secondary epistemological status of the image. Using Jung's concept of the autonomous psyche of an essentially archetypal nature, Hillman started to question Jung's concept of the Self as a central archetype symbolizing a sort of disguised traditional monotheism (the Christian God, the Jewish Yahweh etc.) like Freud's sexuality (id) or central cultural myth (the Oedipus myth). Imaginal psychology defends essential sovereignty and the equality of all images and the resultant polytheist psychology. Jungian studies set out it this direction, giving birth to parallel developments to imaginal psychology in various fields. Derrida's and Feyerabend's rejection of an ultimate referential frame was not identical to but corresponds to Hillman's and Vannoy Adam's discovery that it is fantasy that rules the psyche.
essential secondary product of the human mind. Starting with the tradition of western epistemology (Plato), imagery and image were considered misleading and vague entities and were frequently restricted to art, religion, and eventually to "pseudoscientific disciplines". But imagery plays a role not just in the subjective but also in the external world of man.
Taking imagery seriously is quite a contemporary phenomenon. The traditions of western philosophy and suspicious attitudes to imagery have overlapped almost since the very inception of western philosophy. Ironically it was Kant who initiated the great liberation of human imagery from subjugation to rationality. His einbildungskraft and the romanticist movement of the time enabled imagination to gain legitimate status in the human psyche, psychology and epistemology.
The seemingly unshakable status of the long dominant epistemological principles of rational and material reality had already begun to weaken during the 18 th century with David Hume and Immanuel Kant. Nevertheless, neither the romanticist cultural revolution nor German Naturphilosophie 2 superseded the rationalist and progressivist vein of the 19 th century. Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis remained faithful to the reality principle and fantasy/imagination/imagery continued to be viewed with considerable suspicion. Jung conceded to subconscious autonomy, independence, knowledge, and creativity, which drew him nearer to the German romanticists and to the imaginal concept of the psyche. The different attitudes held by Freud and Jung were probably due to their different personalities and also their relationship to philosophy as well. Even though Jung suffered from a love-hate relationship with philosophy (Jarrett, 1981; Jung, 1960) , as a youth he had already been completely absorbed in the history of ideas whereas Freud deliberately avoided reading philosophical texts (Kugler, 2008, p. 85) . In Psychological Types Jung presented quite an extensive commentary on the western history of ideas. Jung considered himself Kantian-contrary to Freud he conceived of images as primary phenomena of the autonomous psyche, i.e. entities similar to Kant's a priori structures.
3 But the Kantian subject could not envisage a collective unconscious or unconscious processes. Here the missing link between Kant and Jung is proffered by German romanticists, naturphilosophie or Schopenhauer. While Jung did not refer to Hegel, 4 he often mentioned Schopenhauer. It seems that it is only 2 Ellenberger considers F. W. Schelling to be the founder of that philosophical current because of his assumption about the fundamental identity of spiritual and material nature ("Nature is visible Spirit, Spirit is invisible Nature"). Thus nature is understood as an expression of profound spiritual laws and common spiritual principle (Weltseele). Next to Schelling, there are also Goethe's concepts of Urphänomene, All-Sinn etc. indicating the profound (unconscious) unity of the world and man. Both influences are evident both in Jung and post-Jungians (Ellenberger, 1970, pp. 202-205) . 3 Kant's a priori ordering of the psyche anticipates Jung's archetypes. Kant initially differentiated between pure and empirical knowledge. He asserted that all knowledge starts with experience, but is not derived from it (as was asserted by Locke). Pure knowledge was supposed to rest in universal a priori notions (categories). According to Kant such a priori ordering must be universal. In Jung's model of the psyche, archetypes ("primordial images") determine our experience. 4 According to Eckman (1986, pp. 88-89) , Jung failed to recognize Hegel as his predecessor: "Despite Jung's personal antipathy to Hegel's writing, Jungian thought's ultimate aims and vision of the universe are actually much closer to Hegel than to Kant, and find in Hegel's thought a more fitting philosophical ally". Jung's philosophical alliance with Kant constitutes some fundamental problems. Kant's bifurcation of subject and object opened up a gulf between knowing the subject and the passive a Schopenhauerian influence which overarches the Kantian and Freudian (psychoanalytic) impact in Jung. There is no doubt that Schopenhauer was the kindred kind of thinker who fits into Jung's idea of philosophy and philosophizing bonded sufficiently with life itself. Being an exceptionally imaginal and pictorial thinker, Jung naturally found an important ally in Schopenhauer. Both paid great attention to dreams, mental images and imagery. Even the very title of Schopenhauer's masterpiece (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung) alludes to the importance of imagery. By "vorstellung" Schopenhauer means phenomena, representations emerging from the unconscious, identified or intuited as images. According to Schopenhauer, for both artist and philosopher, imagery stands in-between and manages to enlarge the subjective consciousness beyond particular objects or images to "timeless subjects of knowing" (Schopenhauer, 1958, p. 199) : Urbilder or Musterbilder, "prototypes" or "archetypes". Intuiting the existence of the unconscious dimension of human subjectivity makes him Platonic and along with the romanticist pioneers of depth psychology he has significantly contributed to the de-construction of the enlightened/rationalist subject. His notion of archetype is a good example of a Jungian synthesis of the rationalistic and romanticist tradition. Despite being similar to rationalistic thinkers' ideas on innate ideas, Jung's archetype does not equate them. It is a form, the non-actualized potentiality of ideas and images that must be first actualized by means of experience. Archetypes should be understood as "innate possibilities of ideas", they are "similar to the Kantian categories": "they give definitive form to contents of themselves, they give definitive form to contents that have already been acquired" by means of experience (Jung, 1970c, pp. 10-11) .
Beyond referentiality: Kant, Derrida, Jung
As suggested above, Kant was a linear ancestor of Jung's structuralist concept. Confronted with Hume's arbitrary fictionalism, in the first edition of Kritik der Reinen Vernunft, Kant emphasized the autonomous nature of the human mind in the cognition process: reason and perceptions are produced by imagery (Einbildungskraft). Till then mental imagery had been conceived of as 1) reproductive and 2) located in the conscious. Conceiving mental images as primary creative phenomena of the human mind and placing synthetic a priori categories beyond human reason, Kant revolutionized both the relation between reason and mental imaging and the approach to process cognition and thinking. In brief, imaging is a necessary precondition of all knowledge.
Kant's liberation of image was later exploited by new romanticist movements in different parts of Europe. Sigmund Freud immersed himself in the study of fantasies, dreams and associations. But this was not until Jung discovered the autonomous dimension of the psyche and its images as the source of human experience that the psyche's capacity to produce images began to be considered as the intermediary between ego-consciousness and the world of outer and inner objects. Mental imaging obtained a completely new role and changed understanding of reality as well. It no longer rests in Platonic eternal ideas, transcendent divinity or unanimated object/world whereas Jung postulates archetype as a psychoid entity which overcomes the Kantian bifurcation of subject and object. Here Jung approximates Hegel. Jung, like Hegelians, urges us beyond "Enlightened" epistemological concepts.
matter. Reality became the function of psychic imaging. Thus, human life consists of psychic images, and experience of reality results from the psyche's capacity to produce images.
The psyche creates reality every day. The only expression I can use for this activity is fantasy … Fantasy, therefore, seems to me the clearest expression of the specific activity of the psyche. It is, pre-eminently … [a] creative activity (Jung, 1970, pp. 50-51) .
Experiencing the inner and outer world occurs in images whose source transcends the conscious psyche. "Reality" obtained a paradoxical quality. First, it resulted from the psyche's capacity to produce images; secondly, imagery became the place of origin of meaning (whereas for the greater part of the western philosophy tradition, the ontological status of imagery was derivative).
In approximately the middle of the 20th century post-modern critique of Western epistemology entered continental philosophy. Foucault and Derrida focused on the old problem of the fundamental platform of the act of interpretation. Both opened up the old question regarding the metaphysical background of the act of interpretation. Ancient and medieval philosophy understood universals as referring to ultimate transcendent reality. This is very similar to the way in which the reproductive theory of images referred to transcendent/ metaphysical idea/form/archetype. The reproductive theory of image was fundamentally shaken by Hume who developed it ad absurdum and removed all its metaphysical scaffolding and exposed it to epistemological solipsism. Derrida did something similar with language: he started questioning the reproductive concept of language and removed any kind of reference to ultimate/transcendent "reality" whatsoever.
Hume inquired as to the "reality" behind inner and outer images, while Derrida inquired as to the "reality" behind language. In this way the medieval dispute between realism (referential models of "reality") and nominalism (there are no universals) was renewed. With Derrida, post-modern inheritor of medieval nominalists, it became evident that if we withdraw from the supposed referentiality (reproductivity) of words, we cannot go beyond the text and find ourselves in solipsism. Derrida's text is solipsist text and it is analogous to Hume's arbitrary fictionalism: Derrida's post-modern deconstruction does not refer to ultimate meaning nor does Hume's arbitrary fictionalism.
Hume's epistemological skepticism led Kant to a radical change of perspective. Kant left behind his extreme concepts (referentiality and fictionalism) and overarched them with transcendentalism. Leaving the traditional perspective of Western epistemology (referentialism: our mode of cognition must conform to the object of experience), Kant introduced an extra-conscious platform of the human psyche (innate a priori categories) which makes all human experience possible and which is universal (empirical rules cannot guarantee universality). Together with this epistemological model Kant introduced two modes of knowledge: 1) things as phenomena and 2) things as noumena. In fact, the concept of noumena was posited only negatively to set the limits of human reason. Although Kant did not use the concept of the conscious and unconscious mind, Jung extended the implications of Kritik der reinen Vernunft and applied them to his model (archetypes conceived of as a priori categories) of the human psyche. In Jung the Kantian a priori categories became "innate possibilities of ideas", i.e. "similar to Kantian ideas". However, Jung understood archetype not as an idea nor as an image but as a disposition to certain images and ideas and he clearly discerned between archetype and archetypal image. Whereas archetype in itself is a somehow unknowable core that "never was conscious and never will be ... it was, and still is, only interpreted" (Jung, 1970, para. 266) , archetypal representations are "mediated by the unconscious so as it should not be confused with the archetype as such. They are very varied ... and point back to one essential 'irrepresentable' basic form. The latter is characterized by certain formal elements and by certain fundamental meanings, although these can only be grasped approximately" (Jung, 1970a, p. 25) .
The concept of archetype an sich as it was posited in the 1940s gave psychology a fundamental status similar to that of biology, neurology and other disciplines. In the post-war period a number of experts started dealing with analogies between Jungian archetypal theory and theories from other disciplines (Samuels, 1985, pp. 26-43) . Meanwhile, influenced by post-Freudian revisions and critiques, psychoanalysts started coming to the conclusion that the positions of the Jungian school and psychoanalysis were converging (Roazen, 1976, p. 272; Samuels, 2008, p. 4) .
Beyond the structural concept of psyche
Today's post-Jungians embrace Jung as a structuralist (Vannoy Adams, 2004, pp. 41-56; Kugler, 2008, pp. 77-91; Shamdasani, 2003) , and as stated above, they often underscore his anticipation of analytical psychology's convergence with various Freudian schools of psychoanalysis that took "structural theory" as one of their perspectives (Vannoy Adams, 2004, pp. 41-56) . Jungian tradition has a structural theory too: it describes relations between "persona", "ego", "shadow", "anima", "animus" and the "Self". Edinger (1972; 1994, pp. 11-12) understands the dynamics of the psyche in terms of its bi-polar structure: the ego-Self axis; other authors distinguish between four types of archetypes: 1) "shallow" archetypes (persona and shadow), 2) "archetypes of sex", 3) "archetypes of spirit" (old wise man and crone) and finally 4) the Self (Samuels, 1985, pp. 31-32) . Also the bi-polarity of archetypes (ego/self, conscious/unconscious, personal/collective, extraversion/introversion, rational/ irrational, Eros/Logos, image/instinct) seems to imply a structuralist concept. Nevertheless, during Jung's life the structural concept of the psyche or the hierarchy of archetypes was already being discussed (Samuels, 1985, pp. 92-93) .
In the post-war period structural concepts enjoyed vast application both in the social sciences and in psychoanalysis. Jung's followers and experts from different disciplines (biology, neurology, and so on) started looking for a common field of study that would enable them to grasp both the archetype and its manifestations. Within Jungian tradition itself critical distance towards Jung would not occur until James Hillman's Terry lectures at Yale University (1972) and his Re-Visioning Psychology (1975 (Samuels, 1985, pp. 107) . It was probably the first step to breaking with the structural perspective within Jungian psychology. 6 But such a process was inevitably intertwined with the process of a more radical liberation of the image within the Jungian field of study. Hillman's attack upon the "ego-self axis" was not just an attack upon the idea of "privileged" or "superior" images, but also upon the Platonic idea of a hierarchy of archetypes/images and a tendency to impose theoretic (including structural) concepts. It led Hillman to make some objections relating to contemporary psychology and its philosophical and cultural underpinnings.
Decentred -polycentred -polytheist psyche
Hillman does not understand archetypes structurally. He does not order them in a sort of hierarchy. Hillman himself speaks about the "Self" as an abstract concept imposed on the psyche from without and to proceed in Re-Visioning he has to repudiate the "dogma of self-domination" because the Self literally gained control of Jungian psychology.
7 According to Hillman a theory of personality should start with dreams and dream images 8 because the human being is "primarily an imagemaker and our psychic substance consists of images; our being is imaginal being, an existence in imagination. We are indeed such stuff as dreams are made of" (Hillman, 1975, p. 23) . For Hillman Jung's main contributions consist in his approach to mental images, i.e. in personification (Hillman, 1975, p. 20) .
Personification had already played an important role in Freud. But it was not "restored as a valid idea through classics or philosophy (...) but in the consulting room and the insane asylum" (Hillman, 1975, p. 13) . It was psychopathology that led Freud and Jung to the idea not even agreement regarding use of terminology. There were objections to the use of the term "PostJungian" from Edinger and Henderson. 6 The second was probably an attack by Hillman (Giegerich and Fordham as well) against Erich Neumann's concept of hero (an archetypal metaphor for consciousness). For Neumann "egoconsciousness" has inevitably masculine features. Its development and growth depends on its separation from its feminine counterpart -the Great Mother. Giegerich and Hillman viewed a "heroic ego" as something inherently dangerous for the imagination (a too strong and dominant ego-heroic-image threatens the plurality of other images). 7 "Another reason why Hillman considers the Self dispensable is that it is not just any concept. In Jungian psychology, the Self is the 'concept of concepts'. The Self is the Concept with a capital 'C'. It is God with a capital 'G'. It is Yahweh with a capital 'Y'. Jung says that 'in the place of a jealous God' Freud substituted sexuality, which then assumed 'the role of a deus absconditus, a hidden or concealed god'. According to Jung, however, 'the psychological qualities of the two rationally commensurable opposites-Yahweh and sexuality-remained the same'-only the name was different. Similarly, in the place of God Jung substitutes the Self, which is just as jealous as Yahweh. Just as for Freud sexuality is God, for Jung the Self is God by another name" (Vannoy Adams, 2006). 8 "Because our psychic stuff is images, image-making is a via regia, a royal road to soul-making. The making of soul-stuff calls for dreaming, fantasying, imagining. To live psychologically means to imagine things; to be in touch with the soul means to live in sensuous connection with fantasy. To be in the soul is to experience the fantasy in all realities and the basic reality of fantasy" (Hillman, 1975, p. 23). of the psyche's propensity to personify. Hillman notes that Freud's basic "structural notions" (Censor, the Superego, the Primal Horde, Eros etc.) are personifications. Nevertheless, for Hillman, Freud's psychoanalysis proved to be a mere translation of one kind of images into other ones: ancient personified images were translated into another fantasy (formulated in the so-called objective and neutral language of numbers and structures, i.e. "objective", "scientific", non-imaginal and non-mythological). Freud's psychoanalysis provided the psyche with another scene for personifications, which is why Freud's psyche continues speaking about herself in her own way as it did in ancient times: "a mythic manner of speaking is fundamental to the soul's way of formulating itself" (Hillman, 1975, p. 20) .
Whereas Freud enacted new "psychoanalytic" mythology without being aware of it, Jung risked his reputation as scientist and "reverted courageously to the direct mode of personifying which in his day was still considered a primitive formulation" (Hillman, 1975, p. 21) . Whereas philosophers before him described such psychic forces as mental phenomena, Jung resorted to archaic method-and personified them.
Acceding to a mythic manner of speaking, Jung opened up a vast space or a broader view of the psyche. Personification became Jung's fundamental method. Working with word associations, an active imagination, discovering autonomous complexes, he started using personification as a way of having a dialogue with the psyche.
Personification is a psychic process or "mode of thought" upon which anthropomorphism or animism rests and thus forms the basis of ancient mythologies, dreams, and fantasies. Hillman defines it as a "'mode of thought' which takes an inside event and puts it outside, at the same time making this content alive, personal, and even divine" (Hillman, 1975, p. 12) .
There were also some philosophical presumptions resulting from his neo-Kantian position, which-embedded in western Christian tradition-expressed what Hillman calls "monotheist culture" (Hillman, 1975, p. 168) . In his view the majority of theoretical disciplines are obsessed with unified theoretical models because the modern psyche comes out of the monotheist tradition: "The monotheistic model may be overtly religious, as is Jung's self, or disguised, as in Freud's attempt at a comprehensive system. Organicism, holism, unified-field theory, monistic materialism, and other psychologies express their fundamental monism through insistence upon clarity, cohesion, or wholes" (Hillman, 1975, p. 35) .
Accepting the psyche's propensity to personify, Jung came nearer to its mythological, imaginal basis. Hillman's programmatic motto "stick to the image" moved him on a bit further. Depriving the psyche of the rational ego's strict monopoly, he entered the vast space of polycentrism, i.e. the number of images that-in his view-should be neither hierarchized nor structured. Even ego-complex Hillman considers the ego-image-one of many equally important mental images. De-centralizing, de-structuring and de-constructing psyche, he opens up a new perspective enabling us to view the "lower layers of psyche": "Myth offers the same kind of world. It too is polycentric, with innumerable personifications in imaginal space. Just as dream images are not mere worlds in disguise (...) so the ancient personifications of myths are not concepts in disguise" (Hillman, 1975, pp. 33-34) .
Aware that his perspective is extreme, Hillman admits that the majority of psychology schools must view it as pathological: this movement of consciousness into psychological reality is experienced at first as pathological; things fall apart as the one becomes many. Recognition of the multiple persons of the psyche is akin to the experience of multiple personality. Personifying means polycentricism, implicating us in a revolution of consciousness-from monotheistic to polytheistic" (Hillman, 1975, p. 35) .
Nevertheless, Hillman's "soul-making perspective" is a polytheist perspective enabling us to get across the diversity of the soul, rejecting monotheist prejudices and implying radical relativism. In Vannoy Adams' words, Hillman proposes a de-literalizing of reality, i.e. putting an end to the reality principle and substituting it with a fantasy principle (Vannoy Adams, 2004, pp. 1-19) .
In one of his latest works Vannoy Adams defends imaginal/post-Jungian psychology as one that leaves behind a structural perspective: Does Jungian analysis need a structural theory? Or can it do very well without one? I maintain that there is little to be lost and much to be gained if Jungian analysis dispenses entirely with the structural theory of the persona, ego, shadow, anima or animus, and Self-and relies instead on a post-structural theory" (Vannoy Adams, 2004a, p. 40).
Today, it seems that the "Hillmanian perspective" views the psyche as an entity with a natural propensity to personify, to mythologize and to produce images. At the same time it postulates the psyche as naturally dividing itself into many parts and images.
Ensouled world and theory of science

William James says that the distinction between pluralism and monism is "the most pregnant of all dilemmas of philosophy". James asks: "Does reality exist distributively? or collectively? -in the shapes of eaches, everys, anys, eithers ? Or only in the shape of an all or whole?"
Michael Vannoy Adams
Hillman rejects the imposition of psychological-philosophical preconceptions on the human psyche. The perspectives and positions held by Hillman and dealt with above make him protest against the invasive conduct of psychology toward what he calls the world, the soul or, better yet, the ensouled world. For him it was the mechanicist and rationalist dogmatizer Descartes who "banished the psyche at the beginning of our modern period": personality (psychology), of insanity (psychopathology), of matter and objects (science), of the cosmos (metaphysics), and of the nature of the divine (theology). (...) Some people in desperation have turned to witchcraft, magic and occultism, to drugs and madness, anything to rekindle imagination and find a world ensouled. But these reactions are not enough. What is needed is a revisioning, a fundamental shift of perspective out of that soulless predicament we call modern consciousness (Hillman, 1975, pp. 1-3 ).
Hillman's call for a "fundamental shift of perspective" has profound implications and echoes developments in the theory/philosophy of science in the second half of the 20th century. Although Kuhn, Feyerabend, Bohm and Capra were not "champions of the psyche" and did not share Hillman's desirable perspective (soul-making 9 ) they argued against the Newton-Cartesian paradigm as well. Supported by various philosophy currents and scientific findings, post-Jungians seemed to stand on the threshold of a new chapter in the history of science.
Modern philosophy had already encountered the problem of "objective truth" at the fin-de-siècle. This situation led to refutation of the then widely accepted idea that science was permanently separated from philosophy. Such tendencies encouraged the already existing irrationalist philosophical current. 10 The irrationalism of the 19th century responded to classical physics whose foundations were entering a crisis. Moreover, the principle of illustration started to disappear-a shift from mechanicist concepts to quantum-relativist ones, the study of the subatomic cosmos, elementary particles, the discovery of different levels of the physical world, all that made early 20th century science an extremely abstract enterprise with a large dose of a human/subjective factor: the imaginary! The idea that science was permanently separated from philosophy had to be discarded and scientists began studying the philosophical premises of their work. After 1945 the positivist notion of science was rejected (Holzbachová, 1996, p. 73) . It was Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions that marked a symbolic coup de grâce to the Newton-Cartesian tradition of Western rationality and after Kuhn the problem of ultimate and "objective" truth was further relativized. In the 1970s and 1980s Paul Feyerabend represented a radical extension of Kuhn's theses. The proposition in his ground-breaking work that the "dogma of a rational/positivist/scientific God" should be destroyed or that Western rationality should be demythicized parallels a Hillmanian destruction of the "dogma of self-domination". The implication of their work led to the opening up of an unexpected free space and cross-science influence, to wide theorizing about the influences of science-society and even to the idea of science as a plural or disunited entity.
Feyerabend was probably the most radical critic of the previous philosophy of science. His rejection of the demarcation problem and acceptance of the equal importance of 9 Hillman borrowed the term from romanticist poets (William Blake, John Keats): "From this perspective the human adventure is a wandering through the vale of the world for the sake of making soul. Our life is psychological, and the purpose of life is to make psyche fit, to find connection between life and soul" (Hillman 1975, ix) . Inspired by Henri Corbin (1972, pp. 1-19) Hillman-like Corbindifferentiated between "imaginal" and "imaginary" where the latter is associated with unreal fantasy. 10 Friedrich Nietzsche (especially in Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen) rejected history as science. Oswald Spengler (a radical refusal of a causal reading of history) criticized the ideal of positivist science as extremely naive. different scientific traditions may seem to make him a kindred spirit of Hillman's polytheist psychology. Despite the considerable similarities (a call for a "fundamental shift of perspective", Hillman's liberty to imagine as a fundamental human liberty and Feyerabend's liberty to think within whatever scientific tradition), there are also considerable differences. Whereas Feyerabend is (regarding knowledge and its standing in society) a radical democrat or egalitarian and anarchist, Hillman is firmly rooted in the Jungian/Platonic/ tradition and greatly privileges the autonomy of the psyche as the paramount principle of his philosophy. Feyerabend could follow the Hillmanian soul-making perspective as one of many perspectives. Whereas Feyerabend believes in "objective" scientific progress (albeit not in the positivist sense as an accumulation of findings but as a permanent shift from one paradigm to another one), Hillmanian "progress" takes the form of Jungian circumambulatio, i.e. repeated and "eternal" walking around primary data produced by the unconscious which is, in fact, the essence of Hillmanian "soul making" activity (such as the conscious personality engaged in dialogue with its unconscious counterpart). Since the psyche is made up primarily of images, Hillman does not look for intellectual certainty but works with metaphors, ambiguities and fictions.
Imaginal psychology operates on a completely different terrain and progress or "expansion" is understood simply as an "expansion of consciousness" that takes place as a result of conscious-unconscious dialogue. If there is any intellectual activity required by Hillman, then it is what he calls "seeing through intellect":
The infinite regress of psychologizing, its interiorizing process from visible to invisible (...)-this infinite regress here comes to rest because here it meets the permanent ambiguity of metaphors (...). For these intellectual concepts, like all intellectual concepts, 'rest' or find 'permanent ground' and 'base' in metaphor and can only be 'established' by consent of metaphor. It is the imaginal that gives certainty to our intellectual sureties, augmenting the intellect beyond itself (...) to connote and imply and suggest always more than its terms would denote. For the intellectual too expresses fantasies that are rooted in myths, and these fantasies can be exposed by the psychologizing eye of the soul. Nunquam enim satiatur oculus visu, said Cusanus. 'The eye, as a sense organ is never satiated nor limited by anything visible; for the eye can never have too much of seeing; likewise, intellectual vision is never satisfied with the truth ...The striving for the infinite, the inability to stop at anything given or attained is neither a fault nor a shortcoming of the mind; rather it is the seal of its divine origin and of its indestructibility' (Hillman, 1975, pp. 152-153) .
Feyerabend would have certainly accepted all those archaic scientific systems, both ancient and modern oracular techniques, theories and practices as equal to Western science. He does not mention psychological transference or participation mystique in primitive mentality but is well aware of the fragmented consciousness of the Ancients and of the fact that they lived in a plurality of different or inconsistent images. After analyzing the Homeric world Feyerabend argues in favour of a plural, disunited, fragmented, non-dogmatic, manysided outer and inner world (or its image?) as he sees it in old Greek myths, religion, science and culture:
(...) the archaic world is much less compact than the world that surrounds us, and it is also experienced as being less compact. Archaic man lacks 'physical' unity, his 'body' consists of a multitude of parts (...); and he lacks 'mental' unity, his 'mind' is composed of a variety of events, some of them are not even 'mental' in our sense, which either inhabit the bodypuppet as additional constituents or are brought into it from the outside. Events are not shaped by the individual, they are complex arrangements of parts (...). This is the world-view that emerges from an analysis of the formal features of 'archaic' art and Homeric poetry. (...). Further evidence for the conjecture can be obtained from an examination of 'meta-attitudes' such as general religious attitudes and 'theories' of (attitudes to) knowledge. For the lack of compactness just described reappears in the field of ideology. There is a tolerance in religious matters which later generations found morally and theoretically unacceptable (...). Archaic man is a religious eclectic, he does not object to foreign gods and myths, and he adds them to the existing furniture of the world without any attempt at synthesis, or removal of contradictions. There are no priests, there is no dogma, there are no categorical statements about the gods, humans, the world. (This tolerance can still be found with the Ionian philosophers of nature who develop their ideas side by side with myth without trying to eliminate the latter.) There is no religious 'morality' in our sense, nor are the gods abstract embodiments of eternal principles. (...) This is how life was dehumanized by what some people are pleased to call "moral progress" or "scientific progress" (Feyerabend, 1993, pp. 183-184) .
Jung supposes that any (conscious) striving for monotheism (religious, scientific etc.) automatically generates a response on the other (unconscious and polytheist) pole. Supposing that these dynamics work both on the individual and collective level, the postmodern stress on multiplicity and relativity should be understood as a psychological and cultural reaction to the longlasting monotheist, one-sided conscious attitudes of Western culture over the centuries. Even if we suppose that unity and multiplicity are indiscernible (coniunctio oppositorum) on a fundamental level, post-Jungians consider psychological monotheism as utterly untenable:
